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Soli al Mondo: The Recourse to “Sovereigntism” in Contemporary Italian 
Populism 
 
 
John Agnew 
 
     
The Italian President, Sergio Mattarella, opening a 2018 conference dedicated to the condition of 
the European Union, spoke of the need to avoid the “temptation of a sovereigntist narrative” 
(Magliocco 2018). The same day, Paolo Becchi, a philosopher close to the populist Movimento 5 
Stelle (Five Star Movement), defined the formation of the Five Star coalition government in 
2018 as “the first victory, with European significance, of ‘sovereigntism’” (Becchi 2018). In 
Italian, “sovranismo” is a neologism combining the word “sovrano” (“sovereign”) and the 
French “souverainisme” (“sovereignty”). The term has clearly entered into Italian political 
language.  
Hostility to immigration, globalization, and the European Union across Europe is 
increasingly framed in terms of reclaiming a “lost” sovereignty that has slipped into the hands of 
foreign capital, transnational institutions, and global cultural elites (Feltri 2018; Zuquete 2018). 
The use of the term “sovranismo” is thus shorthand for a set of claims from a range of political 
positions that call for reinstituting a national government’s control over economic and cultural 
policies and restricting the regulatory and cultural scope of external agencies of all sorts (Feltri 
2018). It has become the go-to word to contrast those who advocate “taking back control” and 
nationalism against the globalists, who are the bête noire of populism. The Italian press, for 
example, is full of stories with titles such as “Il contratto sovranista del nuovo governo” (“The 
sovereigntist contract of the new government” [Fabbrini 2018]); “I fatti dell’anno: Macerata 
burning, le radici dell’odio sovranista” (“The facts of the year: burning Macerata, the roots of 
sovereigntist hatred” [Tizian 2018]); and “Sovranisti e identitari, ecco la sintesi” (“Sovereigntists 
and identitarians, here is the synthesis” [Fratus 2018]).  
Italy is an interesting case for considering sovereigntism because it is widely thought to be 
an example of a state that has always had a weak sense of nationhood (Bodei 2006; Berezin 
2018). The state originated more from conquest than from popular national revolt and was 
unified relatively late compared to many other European states. Multiple factors—cultural 
differences between regions, the developmental gap between north and south, the lack of a 
national vernacular language until the late nineteenth century, and the weakness of state authority 
relative to social institutions such as families and the Catholic Church—have conspired to 
produce a weak national identity. The one major attempt to impose a strong sense of state 
sovereignty, under Fascism, from 1922 until 1943, ended in dramatic failure. Thus, the 
appearance of a discourse of sovereigntism in contemporary Italy is initially surprising.  
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, I provide a survey of the origins and uses of 
contemporary claims in Italy about reinstituting a “full” national sovereignty. These arguments 
have developed at a time in which many people find themselves looking back nostalgically on an 
ostensibly autonomous period when they thought that they and their country were less dependent 
on foreigners. I then turn to the three major arguments made on behalf of sovereigntism by both 
supporters of contemporary populist movements as well as those typically associated with the 
historic left, two groups who argue in similar ways. Their shared concerns include the sacrifice 
of the national “people” to the benefit of a globalizing elite; the European Union’s crisis of 
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legitimacy in the face of multiple dilemmas relating to the Euro and immigration; and the 
perceived threat to Italy’s national identity from immigrants themselves and from the cultural 
norms of other places. In the face of the coronavirus pandemic of 2020 there was much talk of “il 
sovranismo sanitario” (“health sovereigntism”) in which a foreign virus was declared to have 
wrought so much damage on Italy largely out of fear of upsetting foreigners and without 
sufficient support from foreigners, particularly neighboring countries (Dentico 2020). Finally, 
using my own recent writing on the contingency of sovereignty (e.g. Agnew 2018), I point out 
that the push to take back control (as with Brexit, for example) or act on behalf of a newly 
sovereign Italy is based on a misreading of the actual history of sovereignty in the country. This 
misreading involves a romanticized view of the specifics of Italian nation-statehood before the 
inroads of globalization, the European Union, and the boats of migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean in the hope of reaching Italian shores. I pay especially close attention to why Italy 
is not a particularly propitious setting for fulfilling any of the various claims for sovereigntism. 
 
What is Sovereigntism? 
 
According to Treccani Online (n.d.), “sovranismo” is a “Posizione politica che propugna la 
difesa o la riconquista della sovranità nazionale da parte di un popolo o di uno Stato, in antitesi 
alle dinamiche della globalizzazione e in contrapposizione alle politiche sovrannazionali di 
concertazione” (“A political position that advocates the defense or the reconquest of national 
sovereignty on the part of a people or a state, in antithesis to the dynamic of globalization and in 
opposition to supranational policies of agreement through consultation”). The French 
Encyclopédie Larousse indicates a more direct connection to the European Union by stating that 
it is the “doctrine des défenseurs de l’exercice de la souveraineté nationale en Europe” (“doctrine 
of the defenders of the exercise of national sovereignty in Europe”) and traces its logic back to 
the origin of the European Community in the 1950s with both left- and right-leaning variants 
(Encyclopédie Larousse 2019). But as a word it is more recent, dating to 1997, when it was 
probably first used in relation to Quebec’s movement to separate from Canada. In this case, the 
word obviously had a connotation of “independence.”  
In Italy, the neologism was first used publicly in 2016 by the new Fronte Sovranista 
Italiano (FSI) that looked to the “riconquista della sovranità nazionale in ogni sua forma, 
attraverso il ricollocamento della Costituzione al vertice dell’ordinamento” (“reconquest of 
sovereignty in all its aspects, united in the necessity of putting the [Italian] Constitution at the top 
of the Italian legal order” [Fronte Sovranista Italiano 2018]). The Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of 
Italy) Party has since also adopted a “sovereigntist” identity. English political scientist 
Christopher Bickerton (2007, 109) captured an important, negative element of the term when he 
characterizes much of the enthusiasm for international organizations and supranational initiatives 
as well as humanitarian interventions by powerful states in weaker ones as “replacing the politics 
of self-determination with bureaucratic rule that is dependent on external power for its survival.”   
More commonly, however, the term has come into use in a much more bottom-up way to 
refer to a singular alternative to the disenchantment with the financial, economic, and 
immigration policies that have become associated with a world in which seats of power are both 
more distant and more opaque. More specifically, the crisis associated with the use of the Euro 
following the 2007-08 global economic crisis has become an important symbol of the limits of 
supranational power, while the democratic deficit of European Union institutions has pointed 
towards the legitimation crisis facing the open-ended process of European unification. More 
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generally, and typifying leftist positions, multinational corporations and free trade are viewed as 
undermining national sovereignty as supranational organizations like the European Union 
underwrite their operations. Beyond this, the major difference between left- and right-leaning 
variants of “sovereigntism” is that the right sees “nel popolo un’unità organica, intessuta di 
legami fortissimi, che ‘il sangue e la terra’ cementano all’interno di ‘confini’ ben definiti” (“the 
people as an organic unity, woven by strong identity links, that ‘blood and earth’ cements within 
well-defined ‘borders’” [Laboccetta 2018]).  
This leads right-wing populists, such as the League and its leader Matteo Salvini, to 
emphasize national/cultural homogeneity and concern about the cultural impact of immigration. 
Such insistence is more than ironic given the League’s origins in the 1980s as a political 
movement based on a fundamental discrimination between northern and southern Italy as 
distinctive cultural worlds. On the left, by contrast, the emphasis rests on the call for politics to 
take primacy over the market or the economy more broadly. The national territory may not 
necessarily define the sole regulatory or sovereign space; in fact, the European Union can do so. 
Thus, any space “open to progress” including the supranational could fit into this conception of 
regulatory authority (e.g. Labocetta 2018; Cannavò 2018). Increasingly, however, some leftist 
proponents of sovereigntism have argued that they cannot cede ground to the right and have 
increasingly accepted national borders as essential, thereby redefining the term’s meaning on the 
left (e.g. Somma 2018).  
The timing of this political debate is hardly coincidental. Ever since Italy formally adopted 
the Euro in 1999, it has experienced a much lower rate of economic growth than it did before. 
Previously, Italian governments could always devalue the Lira when faced with serious 
economic crises or declining competitiveness. This was no longer possible once the Euro fully 
replaced the Lira in 2002. Following the financial crisis of 2007-08, Italy was one of the 
countries that suffered most from the austerity policies that followed from the increasing spread 
in yields between German and Italian bonds, showing the limits of a monetary system in which 
the lack of European Union-wide bonds and banking imposed costs very unevenly across 
member states of the Eurozone. Finally, Italy’s population flow has changed substantially. Once 
mainly a country of emigration, over the past twenty years Italy has become the first and 
sometimes final stop for an increasing flow of immigrants, largely clandestine, from Africa, the 
Balkans, and the Middle East. Even though many of these migrants and refugees intend to move 
beyond Italy, under European Union rules, Italy as the country of first arrival has been faced with 
the challenge of managing their presence. The fact that many of the immigrants are culturally 
distinctive in numerous ways combines with the absence of a significant domestic tradition of 
multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism to create difficult conditions for integrating immigrants.  
The European Union is frequently blamed tout court for all of these problems. Even if there 
is something to complain about with respect to the European Union immigration policies (though 
in fact, other countries have taken in far more refugees than Italy in recent years), in other 
respects there is some exaggeration, to say the least. Indeed, at least until 2008, the Euro 
provided an opportunity to cut interest rates that could have led to a small investment boom in 
Italy because of the then-positive impact of being in a currency union with other more productive 
economies. But, largely because of the Berlusconi government of 2001-06, Italy missed this 
opportunity by failing to encourage banking competition, clean up toxic assets from business 
balance sheets, invest in infrastructure, and reform tax collection to reduce evasion. Outside the 
Eurozone, the future possibility of currency devaluation of a revived Lira could not compensate 
for the failure to address these entirely domestic issues. 
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Nevertheless, there is a nostalgia in many quarters for a Golden Age, perhaps that of the 
Economic Miracle of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when median incomes increased across the 
board, regional economic inequalities were reduced, and Made in Italy emerged as a global 
brand. A recent cross-national study of popular opinions shows that most Europeans aged 18-65 
are nostalgic, with a majority of those over 35 thinking the world “used to be a better place” (De 
Vries and Hoffmann 2018). But Italians are the most nostalgic of all. 77% of Italian respondents 
are reported as nostalgic as compared to 67% across all 28 European Union member states (as of 
2018). Polish respondents are at the other end of the distribution of opinions, with 59% of its 
population nostalgic. Disproportionately, Italians identified as nostalgic define themselves 
politically as right or center-right and rate immigration as a major problem; however, they have 
fewer issues with individual immigrants (those who live near the respondents) and, perhaps 
surprisingly, they support remaining in the European Union, if somewhat less so than non-
nostalgics (67% to 82%). All told, at least with respect to attitudes toward the European Union, 
sovereigntism has not yet seriously filtered down into popular opinion even among those most 
nostalgic for the past. 
 
Three Threads of Sovereigntism 
 
Most contemporary populist movements share the goal of reestablishing national sovereignty in a 
globalizing world. Quite what this might mean is not always clear. But, according to Jacques 
Sapir, a French economist who specializes in Russia and an important source for those 
supporting the idea of sovereigntism, there are three distinctive senses to the term: the social, the 
political, and the identitarian (Sapir 2016). These overlap in different ways from case to case but 
are useful in distinguishing the various arguments for the importance of national sovereignty 
(Feltri 2018, 48-51).  
The first argument focuses on the distributional consequences of a loss or absence of 
national control and authority such that there is increasing inequality between the people, on the 
one hand, and a small elite, on the other. In this argument the emphasis lies on how much control 
over the generation of wealth is in the hands of people and corporations that give no priority to 
the interests of the national population in question. This is very much the tenor of what could be 
called left-Keynesian critiques of the European Union and the Eurozone, such as that by Fazi and 
Mitchell (2018), which posits an essential opposition between how much the cession of powers 
to the European Union has undermined the possibilities of managing national economic growth, 
and the progressive redistribution of income that once characterized European nation states. In 
other words, the social argument for sovereigntism rests on the social consequences of global 
financialization and the burdens placed on national populations when financialization goes 
wrong.  
From this viewpoint, control over a territorial space is absolutely vital to establishing an 
economic-institutional complex that can exercise the sort of power needed to reorient economic 
policy in a popular direction (Fazi and Mitchell 2018, 286-87). Yet the European Union is far 
from being a straightforward agent of neo-liberal capitalism, as certain leftwing sovereigntism 
advocates contend (see, e.g., Walsh 2019). In fact, in its origins and many of its practices, the 
European Union is an agent of geographical and social redistribution—albeit one with a tiny 
budget, compared to its member states’. Critics of the European Union’s regional and 
agricultural policies rarely regard it as a regulatory agency for global capital. If anything, the 
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European Union actually protects against the free rein of global capital, which proponents of 
neo-liberalism favor, more than most of its member national governments have. 
The second argument is a classically political one to the effect that nation states are based on 
a direct link between citizens and a legitimacy of decisions that supranational entities, such as the 
European Union, lack. Not only an inheritor of familiar institutions and symbols, the nation state 
has historically served as a “public risk manager,” making its own decisions about tax, income, 
and welfare policies (Hosking 2016). From this perspective, the Euro has no people to which it 
corresponds. Its management is entirely technocratic and based on the needs of investors and 
speculators more than the interests of national populations. Many of the most well-known Italian 
sovereigntists, such as Paolo Savona, Alberto Bagnai, and Claudio Borghi, argue from this 
position, even though they are all macroeconomists rather than political theorists. The Euro is 
their main target, rather than the European Union more generally. In this construction, the 
question at hand is whether “sovereignty belongs to the people or to the spread” (the spread 
between German and Italian bond yields under the Euro [see, e.g. Rinaldi 2018]).  
Critics of the European Union’s neoliberalism, such as Alessandro Somma (2018), share 
much of this argument but without making the Euro the center of the dilemma: for them, it serves 
instead as somewhat of a distraction from the European Union’s overall focus on market-making 
at the expense of political regulation. Somma sees the European Union experiment in 
unconstrained market-making as having gone so far that it cannot be reformed without 
reinstituting national matching between economic policy and democratic control. There are 
indeed arguments for increased democratic accountability of the economy within the institutions 
of the European Union, but it is far from clear whether there is much more guarantee of 
democratic revival at the nation-state scale of governance considering the performance over the 
years of many national governments, include Italy’s. 
Finally, perhaps the most commonly made and broadly accepted argument is an identitarian 
one, which extols the virtues of tradition and focuses overwhelmingly on the threat that 
immigration and lack of control over borders poses to national cultural homogeneity. 
Consequently, the identitarian argument is usually associated with right-wing proponents of 
sovereigntism. In France, figures such as Eric Zemmour (2014) and Alain Finkielkraut (2013) 
have built reputations based entirely on this logic (see, e.g., Zerofsky 2019). Islamophobia and 
the defense of traditional “values” are its main stocks-in-trade (Zúquete 2018). In this 
construction, family, nation, work, state, and school have all been dispossessed by foreign 
initiatives and the spread of a destructive individualism.  
In Italy, this perspective is intrinsic to the Lega Nord (Northern League) and its leader, 
Matteo Salvini, who finds ways to argue an identitarian strategy in the public defense of things 
like Italian food and the wearing of Italian police and firefighter uniforms. The irony, of course, 
is that in identifying a bowl of spaghetti as his symbol par excellence of Italianness, Salvini is 
selecting a foodstuff that in his previous iteration as a politician for the Northern League would 
have been representative of the hated South, rather than the Padania for which he used to shill. 
Interestingly, the very values of family, work, and the patriarch-ruled home favored by European 
identitarians tend also to be those favored by Islamists. Only minor identitarian currents play up 
Europe’s historic secularism and openness to cultural change. Additionally, a strange version of 
this perspective claims leftist credentials while offering a critique of capitalism that romanticizes 
an essential Italian culture in its singular struggle with globalization (Fusaro 2015). Either way, 
the European Union and globalization are jointly seen as undermining the settled territories of 
individual nationhood to which all peoples allegedly belong.  
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Yet, as Sapir himself suggests, the racism and xenophobia on which much identitarianism 
depends also constitute its Achilles’ heel. For one thing, identitarians often favor “European” 
rather than specifically Italian or French values, which explains something of the common cause 
across otherwise nationalist rightwing populist movements. Sovereigntism, particularly in its 
political aspect, requires no such cultural specificity. Across its various threads, sovereigntism is 
not a circle that any generalized version can square (Feltri 2018, 50). In practice, the focus on 
identity is typically the driving force behind much of the populism that has swept across Italy 
and the rest of Europe. 
 
Sovereignty’s Contingency 
 
Much of the writing cited above has been criticized on four grounds (e.g. Jackson 2003; 
Appadurai 2006; Abélès 2017; Agnew 2018; Feltri 2018). First, critics point to how 
contemporary states are increasingly redundant in a world in which capital now operates on 
supranational and global scales rather than on a country-by-country basis. Regulatory and 
democratic checks therefore need to be imagined at those scales rather than nostalgically 
relocated to the increasingly irrelevant national scale (e.g. Appadurai 2006; Cannovò 2018), 
particularly since existing states are themselves largely arbitrary, artificial entities and thus not 
necessarily good fits for managing many functions.  
A second critique is that most of the world’s states, including Italy, have never been very 
good at the democratic accountability assumed by proponents of the first two arguments for 
sovereigntism (e.g. Schiavone 2013). The economic history of the world (including Putin’s 
Russia, which Sapir seems to admire) is largely one of extractive or despotic elites extorting 
rents from populations rather than benevolently guiding economic development in the collective 
interest (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).  
The third critique is that many of the institutions of the European Union that are demonized 
by sovereigntism, such as the European Central Bank, are in fact of the same species of 
independent organizations that are found on the national scale. The independence of central 
banks from governmental influence has become widely accepted the world over (e.g. Cassese 
2006; 2018). Finally, many of the world’s states have never been fully sovereign in almost any 
sense of the term. Controlling borders, resisting foreign intervention, serving national 
populations equally across national territories, and generating national feeling have never been 
exercised in the ways that sovereigntists contend. Indeed, the entire exercise is based on a 
dangerous illusion: the recuperation of a sovereignty that never actually existed anywhere (Feltri 
2018). 
It is this last critique that I want to develop here because it is the most important one in 
challenging the entire approach that lies behind the sovereigntism of contemporary populist 
movements (see Agnew 2018). In European political theory, the earliest and most widespread 
discussions about states, statehood, and their grounding in sovereignty date from the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (Skinner 2010, 27). Much debated in political theory, 
the definition of sovereignty might best be captured by a typology that Stephen Krasner has 
recently (1999; 2010) articulated. He identifies two basic principles and one assumption of 
political practice associated with the term (Krasner 2010, 96): 1. International legal sovereignty 
(juridical equality among states, membership in international organizations), based on mutual 
recognition among states; 2. Westphalian sovereignty, based on the absence of submission to 
external rule as expressed in the formula from the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648: Cuius 
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regio, eius religio (“Whoever possesses the region [or territory], his is the religion”); 3. 
Domestic sovereignty, or the effective control over the state’s territory, including cross-border 
flows.  
Krasner argues that these do not constitute an organic whole so much as contradict one 
another. Most of the world’s self-declared states today have international legal sovereignty but 
cannot readily resist the intervention of external powers or exercise particularly effective 
domestic sovereignty. In practice, deviations from the rules of absolute state sovereignty are 
almost the norm. In Krasner’s (1999) memorable phrase, the typical reality of state sovereignty is 
“organized hypocrisy.”  
The entire logic of state sovereignty, therefore, is based in the timeless spaces of sovereign 
territorial statehood that, once established, are taken as permanent givens (Jackson 2003). To the 
extent that there has been much debate about state sovereignty, it has until recently been based 
on the idea of “the persistence vs. the disappearance of the territorial state as the principal form 
of political organization in the Westphalian system” (Gazit 2018, 223). There has been little or 
no attention to the longstanding failure of claims to absolute state territorial sovereignty when 
subjected to rigorous empirical examination (except, e.g., Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2008; Howland and White 2009; Agnew 2018).  
The Westphalian system so ritually invoked as the inaugural form of modern state 
sovereignty was never imagined as “a system of mutually recognized sovereign territorial states” 
(Howland and White 2009, 3). Howland and White explain that, “The Westphalian model also 
imagined that the international system would maintain itself through a coordinated system of 
international law, treaties, and diplomatic exchanges” (2009, 3). In other words, the myth is that 
sovereignty was ever something other than a coordinated system: that it was instead a world of 
equal states with equivalent sovereignties existing independently in the world, without any 
reliance on other polities except for mutual recognition.  
The origins of this powerful myth lie in the desire to restrict the rule of the papacy and other 
overlapping authorities across Western Europe. This desire also provided the groundwork for the 
explosion of competitive colonialism inside and outside of Europe on the part of newly minted 
states. European statehood was born with and into a world that was made more by colonialism 
and commercial expansion than by mutual delimitation of territorial borders with quiescent 
neighbors. Territorial exclusivity, for example, was based on the importation, back home in 
Europe, of mapping and partition strategies developed abroad in colonial expansion (Branch 
2010). With the decline of the European colonial empires as a by-product of world wars and 
nationalist-democratic struggles, “a people could only become sovereign as a state form” even 
when “[p]opulations were diverse and often divided, and territories had indistinct borders” 
(Howland and White 2009, 10). It was not popular sovereignty that defined borders, but the 
imposition of borders between “peoples” that decided who was on one side and who was on the 
other, thus “exercising” the principle of popular sovereignty in different territories (Yack 2012, 
151). 
The contingency of sovereignty also has deep roots in the hierarchical nature of the state 
system dating to the nineteenth century. Two aspects of this hierarchical system merit attention. 
One is the way in which certain powerful states (and interest groups therein, such as businesses) 
defined international law in terms of legal norms and practices that privileged private property 
rights worldwide, irrespective of the nominal jurisdiction where such rights might be located. 
The conversion of land to useful purpose through labor was the usual justification for defining 
and imposing property rights in colonial territories where such rights had previously been either 
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collective or absent altogether (Koskenniemi 2017, 362). The domestic territory was just too 
limited to facilitate the accumulation of resources and capital that colonial expansion could 
provide for European political and business elites. When property disputes arose, they would 
inevitably be settled in favor of the more powerful party with the investments and lawyers to 
enforce their claims. Sovereignty and property have thus always operated together to limit the 
sovereignty of some and expand it for others (e.g. Fitzmaurice 2014; Ince 2014). Turning a blind 
eye to the connection between these two concepts has long been a way of maintaining the fiction 
of equality between states. With the intensifying globalization of production and financial 
services since the 1970s, cities such as New York and London have become centers for the 
enforcement of global property rights worldwide (e.g. Filippi 2019). Corporations and trade 
associations exercise powers that are akin to those of states but often even greater in 
geographical scope and influence (Garrett 2008). Some actors, including some states as well as 
global businesses, are always more sovereign than others.  
Sovereignty’s other root system lies in the military-political dominance of some states over 
others. States are neither born equal nor can a dominant position relative to others be equally 
available to all (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). These inequalities are particularly important in 
relation to domestic sovereignty, as defined by Krasner, and to the capacity to resist external 
interference (as in Westphalian sovereignty). The long trajectory of invasions and interventions 
by the so-called Great Powers, from Britain and France to the United States and Russia, suggests 
how fictive it is to limit the exercise of sovereign powers to the borders of the colored blocks of 
space on the world map. Sovereign powers can be projected over space politically, economically 
and militarily through alliances, sanction regimes, and base networks that usually involve the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the distant power trumping the local one. Sovereignty thereby 
travels over space for some but not for others. 
Yet there are continuing, powerful normative and administrative arguments for locking 
some degree of sovereignty into territorial units with which people have familiarity (e.g. 
Koskenniemi 2011; Rodrik 2013). These need not be nation-states as such but a collective 
mosaic of more local communities, city-regions, and networks (Filippi 2019). The recent 
“backlash against globalization,” is as much about the existence of mass immigration and the 
challenge that immigration poses to a presumed national cultural homogeneity as it is to 
immigration’s direct impact on employment and incomes. This example suggests a substantial 
cultural-political basis for what can be called “nation-statehood” (the combination of a social 
group with a national identity and a state apparatus), where the two terms on either side of the 
hyphen actually coincide, where states are supposed to do things for their populations—provide 
public goods, record civic histories, etc. They also theoretically provide a degree of security from 
domestic and foreign threats. Populist movements appeal to national populations’ anxieties about 
demographic changes, particularly the idea that immigrants will “replace” the “people” or volk 
with foreigners. As Koskenniemi says (2011, 70): 
 
Sovereignty articulates the hope of experiencing the thrill of having one’s life in 
one’s own hands. This is what sovereignty meant for those who struggled against 
theocratic rule in early modern Europe or invoked it to fight for decolonization in 
the twentieth century. Today, it stands as an obscure representative of an ideal 
against disillusionment with global power and expert rule. In the context of war, 
economic collapse, and environmental destruction, in spite of all the managerial 
technologies, sovereignty points to the possibility, however limited or idealistic, 
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that whatever comes to pass, one is not just a pawn in other people’s games but, 
for better or for worse, the master of one’s life. 
 
Sovereignty has also frequently been called upon to frustrate rather than realize anything 
approaching democracy (Morefield 2005). We are all increasingly aware of emergent threats and 
challenges, from climate change to human rights, that cannot be addressed adequately solely on 
the scale of the nation-state. Political systems both democratic and non-democratic, suffer from 
difficulties in dealing with such issues because of time horizons involving elections or dynastic 
succession, questions of responsibility to mass publics who may be massively ill-informed, and 
the low salience of many global issues in relation to the urgent problems of everyday life (Latour 
2016). Undoubtedly, the territorial framing of sovereignty—its outline on a map—matters in 
making it legible to populations at large. Increasingly, however, the best approach to making it 
legible in a more accurate way may be to examine issues in terms of the logics of spatial 
integration and disintegration rather than in terms of fixed territories of sovereign space (e.g. 
Abélès 2017). In other words, problems of different geographic scope require different 
applications of or shares of sovereign space. One size does not fit all. The memory of total 
territorial control associated with contemporary sovereigntism and its obsession with the 
idealized territorial state is a false one with potentially devastating consequences. 
The history of Italy as a unified state is instructive insofar as it draws attention to the 
absence of the total territorial sovereignty long before membership in the European Union or the 
onset of contemporary economic globalization that contemporary sovereigntism turns into a 
resource. That absence must now be addressed, it says. That much of the inspiration for 
contemporary sovereigntism comes from French writers matters. France’s shrinking global 
profile lies behind much of their travail (Zerofsky 2019); Italy is a different story altogether 
(Bodei 2006; Berezin 2018).  
In the first place, Italy is a congeries of regions and localities with distinctive resource bases, 
interests, and identities. North and South, for example, are arguably more distant today in terms 
of economic prospects than was the case in the 1980s (Tortuga 2019). The different regions also 
tend to elect very different parties and politicians. Religion and secularism are variably 
distributed across the country. It was exactly this lack of much cultural and political unification 
that has resulted in movements such as Fascism and the Northern League. In the case of Fascism, 
it came from the lack of a strong “sense of the state” because of Italy’s late unification, an idea 
that could only be forced from the top down. Carlo Levi’s great memoir Christ Stopped at Eboli 
(1945) draws attention to the challenge and ultimately the failure of this effort. In the case of the 
Northern League, the claim was that the North deserved its own government rather than to serve 
as a source for funds poured into a backward and undeserving South. In fact, the support for the 
Northern League (until it mutated into The League between 2013 and 2016) was very much 
based on local identities and the need to protect them in the face of nationalization as well as 
globalization (Agnew 2013). 
In the second place, Italy has always been entangled in interdependencies that have 
invariably limited and directed its options (e.g. Zamagni 2018; Bricco 2019). Dependence on 
foreign markets was central to the Economic Miracle of the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Foreigners have long supplied credit to Italian businesses. Ultimately, managing flows of people 
and goods across the Mediterranean requires more and better collaboration with others, not a 
retreat into a national shell. Any country on its own has limited possibilities for economic 
development. Even large countries such as the former Soviet Union never successfully fulfilled 
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the goal of complete economic autarky. Yet sovereigntism rests, in some cases more obviously 
than in others, on the idea of either capitalism or socialism working their respective marvels 
entirely within the confines of one country. The likelihood of this working in a territory such as 
that occupied by Italy is impractical if not simply impossible. 
Finally, Italy occupies a middling slot in the global state hierarchy (Brighi 2018). It cannot 
avoid committing itself to alliances and dalliances that have consequences domestically. Think 
of longstanding NATO commitments, and the recent flirting with Putin and other despots for 
advantages in accessing Russian natural gas. Irrespective of the other merits of membership in 
the European Union or of globalization more broadly, the idea that Italy can ever be an 
equivalent sovereign to the United States, China, or Russia is not realistic. It will always have to 
adjust and limit its own positions to please these larger powers. Better perhaps to own up to this 
and to enlarge its influence by pursuing a share of a broader sovereignty with its neighbors. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Building walls to mark the borders of states and closing ports or restricting access to migrants, 
refugees, and other external influences (although rarely restricting capital or trade in goods as 
such) has become the order of the day in Europe and elsewhere. Notwithstanding the empirical 
fact that a majority of border-crossers who stay actually arrive legally at airports and then 
overstay their visas, nor the fact that the actual intensity of migration overall into Italy and the 
United States (for example) is significantly less than it was twenty years ago, invasion panics 
characterize politics across the western world as of 2020. The roots of this anxiety are obviously 
complex and related to issues such as stagnating incomes, the cultural identity of migrants 
compared to current natives, and so on. But they also connect profoundly to understanding 
sovereignty as singularly centralized and national-territorial.  
The sovereigntism that has become the leitmotif of contemporary populism in Italy is based 
on this assumption. Yet, as I have tried to show, this sovereigntism is a hopelessly simple-
minded take on sovereignty. At the same time, of course, advocates of globalization deride the 
concerns of the discontented peasants as passé and not worthy of examination (Filippi 2019). It is 
precisely this either/or view of sovereignty within a world once divided up into secure units of 
territorial space, a world now challenged by population and capital flows that know no 
boundaries, that I have opened to challenge. Even as we need to think beyond the state, we must 
also attend to the fact that states, particularly the forty or so worldwide that have some degree of 
effective domestic sovereignty, are still with us for good or ill, whether we like it or not. That 
they are singularly well equipped to do what sovereigntists claim for them is another matter 
entirely. If there is one lesson from the entire Brexit imbroglio, it is that placing one’s faith 
singularly in the managerial capacity of national governments is not the cure-all that 
sovereigntism envisages (see, e.g., Fabbrini 2019). 
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